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Normalization in the Wake of the 1968 Intervention 
By Fred Ei dl in 
Introduction 
Looking back at what happened in Czechoslovakia in 1968, ithas longseemed clear 
to most observers what happened and why. The post-January movement of reform 
and renewal had posed a serious threat to Soviet communist orthodoxy, and thus had 
to be stopped. For eight months, the Soviets tried various means to bring the Czecho­
slovak leadership to act decisively to bring the Situation under control. When this 
didn't work they launched a military intervention which, despite certain undesirable 
consequences, brought about a speedy realization of Soviet aims. Within a few years, 
Czechoslovak politics had been thoroughly "normalized, " i . e . , restored to close con­
formity with Soviet communist orthodoxy. Virtually all resistance and Opposition had 
been neutralized. Almost all aspects of the Czechoslovak reform movement disturbing 
Czechoslovakia's allies had been reversed. AU leaders who symbolized the "Prague 
Spring" had recanted or been replaced by obedient executors of the Soviet policy. AU 
declarations and the resolutions proclaiming the intervention to be illegal andunneces-
sary had been declared nul and void. Such results make it hard to děny the success of 
Soviet policy. The Soviets had made clear what they didn't like during the "Prague 
Spring" and, since all this changed after the intervention, it looks like a straightforward 
čase of the successful achievement of aims. 
However, present reality and the apparent inevitability of what actually happened 
make Soviet policy look far more prescient, rational, coherent, successful and guided 
by long-range stratégy than it actually was. What actually happened naturally possesses 
a concreteness and plausibility that other possible outcomes or variations along the 
causal chain cannot have had. This makes it easy to overlook the substantial body of 
evidence suggesting confusion, disunity, indecisiveness and especially ambivalence 
among Soviet decision makers about how to deal with Czechoslovakia. It also makes 
it easy to forget, or at least underestimate, the significance of the initial failure of the 
intervention to achieve its aims, as well as the stumbling, ad hoc nature of Soviet policy 
in Czechoslovakia during the months following the intervention. Seen through the 
lens of a "normalized" Czechoslovakia, however, the outcome appears as a quick 
realization of predetermined Soviet policy aims. 
Fewpeople nowadays even remember that the invasion of August21st, 1968, failed 
to achieve its immediate aimsx. N o puppet government emerged and virtually the 
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entire population of Czechoslovakia and its ruling institutions spontaneously mobiliz-
ed into a coordinated, non-violent resistance movement, which the uninvited foreign 
troops were unable to bring under control, despite the overwhelming force at their 
disposal. After two days of unsuccessful ad hoc attempts to establish a new party and 
governmental authority, the very leaders who had been arrested on August 21 st were 
returned to power. It is also usually forgotten how long and arduous the process was 
by which the reform movement was reversed. In fact, for at least the first seven 
months, apart from being a crushing blow to national pride and morale, occupation 
had far less impact than had been generally anticipated. Not only did the reformist 
leadership remain in power, virtually intact, but in many ways the reform movement 
continued almost as if there had been no military intervention. The Soviets could not 
seem to break the influence of the reformists and bring about the kind of "normaliza-
tion" of the Situation they apparently desired. 
If Soviet policy had aimed simply at crushing the reform movement, this could 
easily have been accomplished by means of a conventional occupation regime. Ob-
viously, however, this was not what Soviet policy makers had in mind. The "Prague 
Spring" and the various attempts to contain it can be fruitfully seen as but one episode 
in a continuing crisis of the Soviet power systém in Eastern Europe. The leaderships 
of the East European Communist states have all been facing different variations of the 
same deep and persistent dilemma since the death of Stalin. Although the regime they 
inherited from Stalin was fundamentally unstable, some of the very features contribut-
ing to this instability belong to the cement that holds together both the Soviet alliance 
systém and the Soviet-type regime itself. Thus, although it has long been clear to the 
ruling elites of these states that systemic reform is absolutely necessary to overcome 
the endemic instability of this type of regime, such systemic reform has also been seen 
as threatening the very foundations of their power and of the Soviet alliance systém in 
Europe2. 
It is thus important to recognize and understand the profound ambivalence of the 
Soviet Union and its orthodox allies concerning the Czechoslovak reform move-
ment3. Without a doubt, this movement represented a serious threat to them. Never-
theless, the leaderships of Czechoslovakia's allies were also well aware that this very 
same movement responded to a profound crisis of legitimacy threatening the very 
foundations of the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia. 
Certainly, by the time of the 1968 intervention, Soviet aims must be seen as includ-
ing the promotion of stable and viable regimes which would be faithful and reliable 
allies. The Czechoslovak reform movement held out real hope that the severe social, 
economic and political problems endangering the stability of the regime might at last 
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be solved, and thus vital interests of the Soviet Union protected. It was thus exceed-
ingly difficult for the Soviet leadership to make up its collective mind whether to 
regard the Czechoslovak reformist leadership and the entire movement of reform and 
renewal as problém or Solution. This helps explain the erratic oscillations in Soviet 
policy during the "Prague Spring" between brutality and intransigence on the one 
hand and understanding and conciliation on the other hand. Evidence of a lack of clar-
ity, unity, and decisiveness on the part of the Soviet Union persisted not only through­
out the "Prague Spring", but also during the months immediately following the inva-
sion4. 
The tragédy of what happened in 1968 is that once an intervention had been launch-
ed as an act of "friendship and brotherly assistance", it simply could not be allowed to 
remain on record as a crime, a failure and a mistake. Once carried out, it had to made 
to appear motivated by high principles, necessary, and successful. For it not to appear 
in this light in the longterm run would have posed far greater dangers to the stability 
of the Soviet power systém than anything that had been going on during the "Prague 
Spring". Moreover, it is precisely because the "normalization" process in Czechoslo­
vakia represented such a profound and irrational denial of reform tendencies ripening 
in all the East European Communist states, including the Soviet Union, that the 
"Prague Spring" and its repression have remained so exceedingly sensitive in these 
countries, even at this writing in mid-1988, when all kinds of political tabus have fallen 
in the atmosphere of Glasnost. 
This article reexamines the widely forgotten initial stages of "normalization," 
during which Soviet policy was in considerable disarray in trying to come to grips with 
these multiple dilemmas in the chaotic, emotionally-charged statě of affairs in post-in-
vasion Czechoslovakia. 
The Incongruity ofthe Occupation During Alexander Dubcek's Tenure 
as First Secretary ofthe Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) 
Several aspects of the political Situation in Czechoslovakia seemed strikingly incon-
gruous in light of the fact that the country had been invaded and remained occupied. 
For example: 
Little Change in the Reformist Leadership: The Czechoslovak leadership remained 
essentially the same as it had been before intervention, despite the fact that Dubček 
and several other reformists at the top of the leadership had been arrested and blamed 
for the statě of affairs that had allegedly made intervention necessary5. During 
Dubcek's tenure as First Secretary only a small number of officials were removed 
from their functions and, in most cases, there was some obvious reason for Soviet 
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dissatisfaction with these individuals apart from their enthusiastic advocacy of re­
formist ideas. Indeed, during this period the pattern emerged that whenever a noted 
reformist was removed from an important position not only was he replaced by some-
one eise with acceptable reformist credentials, but the replacement of a noted pro-
Soviet conservative would be announced at the same time. It was only after Dubcek's 
replacement as First Secretary that massive and systematic purges began, which 
eventually reached down to the lowest levels of the Communist Party and the bureau-
cracies of the State and mass organizations. 
Embarrassing Facts for the Soviets: The Warsaw Pact intervention had been con-
demned in official resolutions of Czechoslovak Communist Party and State bodies and 
mass organizations at all levels, from the Presidium of the Party's Central Committee 
to the government, National Assembly, National Front on down. These condemna-
tions remained on the record. During Dubcek's tenure as First Secretary, the interven­
tion was neither legalized nor justified. Furthermore, in announcing the entry of allied 
troops into Czechoslovakia, the Soviets had claimed to be responding to an appeal for 
assistance from "leading Czechoslovak Party and statě representatives." Yet not a 
single one of these was named or identified himself for years after intervention. This 
State of affairs must have been exceedingly embarrassing to the Soviets, but it was not 
until after Dubcek's replacement that a gradual process began, which eventually led to 
retroactive, official legalization and justification of the intervention and repeal of all 
condemnations of it. 
Under Dubček not only did the intervention remain on record as illegal and 
unjustified, but the Party's official analysis of the pre-invasion political Situation came 
nowhere near to suggesting that intervention had been necessary. To be sure, the leader­
ship admitted that it had made mistakes, that there had indeed been some disturbing 
aspects of the pre-invasion Situation, and that it had underestimated the concern of its 
allies. O n balance, however, post-January, pre-invasion developments continued to 
be represented as far more positive than negative, certainly well under the Party's con­
trol and (by clear implication) in no way requiring foreign intervention6. 
Media Retain Reformist Character: It is well known that the uncensored Czecho­
slovak mass media represented a major source of alarm for the Soviets. And, in the 
secret protocol signed in Moscow on August 26th, the Czechoslovak leadership 
agreed to take Steps to rectify the Situation. In the words of the Moscow Protocol, "a 
series of priority measures" were to be implemented "to control the media so that they 
may fully serve the cause of socialism, and to put an end to the anti-socialist feeling 
expressed by the radio, the television and certain organizations which have taken up 
definite anti-socialist positions." 
6
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... Party and statě organs will watch over the cleansing process of the press, 
rádio and television, by means of new laws and ordinances. In view of the abnor­
mal Situation, the execution of these tasks will require certain temporary meas-
ures so that the government may energetically repress all anti-socialist intrigue, 
whether individual or collective. An overhaul of senior personnel in the press, 
rádio and television will be inevitable7. 
In fact, restrictions on the mass media were announced and actually implemented 
and some senior personnel were relieved of their functions. Under Dubček, guidelines 
were given to the mass media informing them of what they could not write or broad-
cast. Offending publications were given penalties ranging from fines to Suspension 
and even termination. But the restrictions imposed were not severe, and the applica-
tion of penalties was restrained. N o thorough-going purges of the mass media were 
carried out, and they thus remained preponderantly staffed by reform-minded per­
sonnel. Despite the restrictions imposed on them, the media remained lively and criti-
cal. It was only after Dubcek's political demise that preliminary censorship was rein-
stituted and that the mass media were thoroughly purged and placed in the hands of 
hardline orthodox ideologues. 
Status ofthe Party Congresses: It has been widely speculated that a major reason why 
the intervention took place when it did was to prevent the Extraordinary 14th Con­
gress of the CPCz from beginning as scheduled on September 9th. The Soviet leader­
ship had opposed the holding of the Congress from the very outset, and was concerned 
about preparations for it, and especially about its likely results8. Since the Congress 
was expected to eliminate from the CPCz leadership those most in sympathy with 
Soviet positions9, the Soviets faced a choice of intervening before the Congress, or 
accepting the prospect of a complete and legitimate take-over of the CPCz by refor­
mist elements1 0. 
One of the most explicit provisions of the Moscow Protocol was a declaration of the 
Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPCz that the "so-called Fourteenth Con­
gress of the Communist Party, meeting on 22nd August. . . was in breach of Party Sta­
tutes . . . and is . . . invalid," and that an extraordinary congress would be summoned 
only "after the Situation in the Party and the country had been normalized" n . To be 
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sure, the congress was not recognized as valid, but even those elected at the Congress 
to positions of leadership had regarded its results as provisional. It is significant that 
the leadership elected at the Congress dissolved itself only after negotiations with 
Dubček concerning concrete conditions under which the Moscow Protocol would be 
acceptable. In addition to cooptation to the CPCz Central Committee of an adequate 
number of members of the Central Committee elected at the "invalid" Congress, 
those members of the Presidium who had compromised themselves by collaborating 
with the occupation wouldhave to beremoved from that body. Any necessary changes 
in the government and mass media would have to be handled in such a way that those 
replaced would be replaced by less well known, but no less reliable adherents of re­
form. The 14th Congress would have to be held promptly, and negotiations regarding 
the vvithdrawal of foreign troops would have to begin without delay. Not only were 
these conditions accepted by Dubček in essence but, as the record shows, they were, 
for the most part, adhered to until after the change of leadership in April, 196912. 
The delegates who participated in the "invalid" Congress - so much anathema to 
the Soviets - were even thanked by Dubček at the Central Committee Plenum of 
31 August 1968 for having greatly contributed to the authority of the Party through 
their actions1 3. 
Furthermore, the validity of the Extraordinary Congress of the Communist Party 
of Slovakia which, like its Czechoslovak counterpart, had opened under clandestine 
conditions: was not challenged. And, throughout the September 1968 to April 1969 
period, the Party leadership seemed firmly committed to convoking a constituent con­
gress of the Communist Party in the Czech lands as soon as possible to serve as a 
counterpart to the Slovák Party, and to convene the Extraordinary Czechoslovak 
Party Congress without too much delay. Since the delegates to both of these congres-
ses would have been the same as those who had assembled at the invalidated Congress 
on August 22nd, the outlook for reform might have seemed encouraging u . Although 
it is true that in the following months the Soviets would not give the go ahead for either 
of these Congresses, under Dubček the aim of holding them in the near future was 
never abandoned. 
Programmatic Reform: Examining the Speeches of the top Czechoslovak leadership 
and the programmatic Statements of the country's ruling bodies in the months follow­
ing the invasion, one gains theimpression that the leadership had notreally abandon­
ed any of the fundamental principles of its reform program. To be sure, all program­
matic Statements of the post-invasion period take notice that the complex realities of 
the post-invasion Situation necessitated a slower pace of reform. A more alarmed atti-
tude toward "anti-socialist" tendencies in society is apparent, and in generál, greater 
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effort is made to calm Soviet15 fears. Nevertheless, during this period the Party does 
not, as yet, appear to have abandoned any of its fundamental reform principles. 
Whether or not these impressions are correct depends on two sets of questions: First 
of all, what were the fundamental principles of reform of the CPCz, and, second, to 
which of these principles were the Soviets unequivocally opposed? Since I do not be-
lieve a clear answer can be given to either of these questions, it is exceedingly difficult 
to determine the extent to which the programmatic reform that survived at least Dub­
cek's period of leadership was really incongruous. 
Throughout Dubcek's tenure (and even after), the Party leadership remained 
unequivocally committed to their Party's "post-January" policies. The problém for 
our analysis lies in discovering any concrete or fixed meaning for this notion, since it 
came to mean so many different things to so many different people throughout 1968 
and 1969. As Antonin Kurina wrote in March 1969: "January is endorsed by progres­
sives, conservatives and reactionaries, rightists and leftists, people of the centre and I 
do not know what eise they call themselves or how we Christen them. And who would 
dare speak differently in public? He would be booed and thrown out . " 1 6 
Most analysts have taken the Action Program adopted at the April 1968 Plenum of 
the Communist Party's Central Committee 1 7 as a standard against which to measure 
the status of programmatic reform in Czechoslovakia after the invasion. It is not, 
however, a particularly satisfactory standard. 
The Action Program was drafted and accepted by the Party early in 1968 as a kind 
of first draft of a reform program. It had not been subjected to the test of experience. 
At the time, the Party leadership could have had no way of foreseeing how the Situa­
tion might develop. As the Resolution of the November Plenum of the Central 
Committee put it: 
The Party's Action Program, following the conclusions of the April Plenum 
became the first integrated step toward formation of the Party's further course of 
action. The Action Program did not, and understandably could not, give an 
immediate answer to all questions and to a number of questions it could not even 
give complete and absolutely precise answers1 8. 
It was therefore regarded only as basic Party policy for the immediate future. As an 
open program it would be tried out theoretically and in practice, corrected where 
necessary and developed further in accordance with the decisions of the CPCz C C , in 
such a way that at a regulär congress of the Party an integrated Party policy could be 
approved, which would correspond to the stage already reached in the generál pro-
gress of socialism in the CSSR. 
Admittedly this resolution was composed under the shadow of foreign troops, 
15
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but it does in fact articulate a point of view implicit in Party policy even before the 
intervention. 
It should be recognized that, despite the great hopes awakened by the Action Pro­
gram, the Party leadership would probably have had to qualify, modify and even 
retreat from aspects of it even had there been no intervention. One of the primary 
objectives of the Action Program at the time it was put forward was to attract the 
widest possible support for a severely discredited Party. It sought to establish and 
maintain the "leading role of the Party" by presenting an attractive political program, 
thus winning freely-given support. The party offered this program in an atmosphere 
of impatient desire for reform, in which the belief was widespread that the Soviet 
Union had changed enough since its 1956 intervention in Hungary that it would not 
block such reform by force. To treat the Action Program as a fixed map of CPCz 
policies would be somewhat analogous to taking literally Speeches from the throne in 
British Commonwealth countries or the platforms of U.S. political parties. It would 
be to ignore the fundamentally open, political character of the Action Program. 
A delegation of the Czechoslovak leadership headed by Dubček was informed on 
October 4th that the Action Program was "actually an incorrect programmatic docu-
ment" 1 9 . Nevertheless, the Party leadership did not really abandon it. To be sure, the 
Action Program was not mentioned as frequently, nor was it referred to as represent-
ing the current framework of Party policy. But none of its principles were explicitly 
repudiated and it continued to serve as a point of reference. 
Moreover, it is not clear that the Soviets were unequivocally opposed to the Action 
Program. Nor is it clear just which concrete aspects they opposed and how seriously. 
To be sure, as has been widely noted in the literatuře, several aspects of the Action 
Program obviously ran against the grain of orthodox Soviet-type Communist prin­
ciples. It is also true that most of the important programmatic reforms of the Action 
program were subsequently abandoned, reversed, or drained of substance. Yet, the 
relevant evidence suggests that the Soviet leadership was fundamentally ambivalent 
and undecided about the Action Program and seriously divided as to which aspects (if 
any) of it should give cause for alarm. 
As H . G. Skilling points out, the Soviet newspaper, Pravda, on April 30th in its 
first füll article dealing with Czechoslovakia gave a positive appraisal of the Action 
Program2 0. Smrkovský states that in discussions held between Czechoslovak and 
Soviet leaders on May 4th the Soviets had expressed some reservations about the 
Action Program, but the sense of these reservations was that the Czechoslovak 
leadership was allegedly insufficiently clear about what it wanted 2 1. Moreover, as 
Zdeněk Hejzlar points out 2 2 , despite their undeniable uneasiness about the Czecho-
19
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slovak reform movement, until after the invasion the Soviet leadership neverpublkly 
criticized the Action Program, the composition of the Czechoslovak leadership or the 
decisions ofthe Communist Party's Central Committee and its Presidium. Finally, it 
must be noted that in most, if not all, the areas of reform addressed by the Action Pro­
gram, similar reforms could be found in other Warsaw Pact states which represented 
at least as radical departures from orthodox Soviet political norms. 
The Czechoslovak response to the August intervention hardened Soviet attitudes 
toward the Czechoslovak reform program. The Soviets had expected the leaders, insti-
tutions and population of Czechoslovakia to acquiesce in the occupation of their coun­
try 2 3 . The dramatic failure of these expectations24 must have drawn Soviet attention to 
the obvious relationships between many of the principles enshrined in the Action Pro­
gram and the Czechoslovak response to the intervention. It does not follow from this, 
however, that the Soviets had a clear picture of how much of the Action Program 
would be allowed, let alone that it would have to be roUed back as far as it eventually 
was. Primary Soviet concern was clearly with more fundamental matters than which 
specific reforms would be allowed. These will be dealt with below. 
It should be useful to note some of the areas of programmatic reform in which pro-
gress surprisingly continued to be made despite the occupation2 5. For example, plans 
for federalization of Czechoslovakia were implemented, despite the fact that this 
initiative was the result of nationalist pressures from the Slovaks. Rehabilitation of in-
dividuals unjustly persecuted in the early years of the Communist regime also contin­
ued and was given wide publicity. New institutional arrangements were established 
providing for a less dictatorial relationship between the Community Party and the 
other social and political organizations comprising the National Front. To be sure, 
there was a slowing down of some reforms and postponement (which in some cases 
turned out eventually to mean abandonment) of others. And yet, in assessing the 
overall Situation, it should beremembered not only that Czechoslovakia was occupied, 
but that the pre-invasion ideals of the reformists had been very high and not guarantee-
ing of realization even had there been no invasion. 
Survival of Reform throughout Society: The post- January 1968 reform movement in 
Czechoslovakia began with the Communist Party and the Party remained in the fore-
front of the movement up to the time of the intervention. However, no adequate cha-
racterization of the reform movement could fail to take account of what was going on 
outside the orchestration and direction ofthe Party leadership. The social and politi­
cal developments usually seen as belonging to the reform movement developed a 
momentům of their own. In many cases specific Party and government measures con-
tributed to, shaped and guided developments. For example, machinery had to be 
set in motion to prepare the legislation bringing about federalization, economic 
2 3
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reforms, and rehabilitation of the unjustly persecuted. Yet, to a significant extent, the 
Party and government were responding to initiatives from outside and were influenc-
ed, advised, pressured, and carried along by debates and developments going on either 
outside the Party and government or within the Party and government but outside the 
immediate control and supervision of the top leadership. 
In countless other cases developments belonging to the 1968 reform movement 
were not the results of official initiatives. They simply emerged in the post- January 
political atmosphere. Developments in the mass media provide an excellent Illustra­
tion. The censors, who had closely controlled the flow of Information under the old 
regime, simply stopped exercising their functions. Journalists and editors then began 
to print and broadcast whatever Information they considered appropriate. New organ­
izations sprang up throughout Czechoslovak society and old organizations, pre-
viously under strict Communist Party supervision began to rejuvenate and reorganize 
themselves. 
It would be a vast undertaking to describe all the significant areas in which reform 
was taking place, since what is at issue here is a society-wide transformation. Even 
Skilling's monumental 900-page work barely Scratches the surface of what was happen­
ing throughout Czechoslovak society. AU this is important to keep in mind, since 
most appearances that the intervention had changed little fall into this category. As 
with programmatic reform, it is difficult to determine clearly just which aspects or 
components of this many-faceted process of social transformation the Soviets opposed 
unequivocally. Here, to, Soviet Union policy was ambivalent, undecided and largely 
uninformed about the Situation. 
To effect changes in this category, it was not enough for the Party leadership to 
make changes in Party policy. Individuais throughout society had to be persuaded or 
coerced to go along with and help to implement such changes, or they had to be replac­
ed by other individuals. It was here, as we will see, that the crux of the problém lay for 
the Soviets as well as for the Czechoslovak leadership. 
Soviet Aims and Objectives and the Constraints on their Realization 
I am well aware that the foregoing sketches of apparent incongruities in the post-in­
vasion political Situation in Czechoslovakia, present a skewed, incomplete picture of 
what was happening. In focusing on those aspects of the Situation which surprisingly 
seemed unchanged despite the invasion, I have largely neglected the important politi­
cal changes taking place during Dubcek's final months as leader of the CPCz, the 
relentless grinding down of the political foundations of the reform movement and the 
concomitant reconstruction of a political base for the faithful supporters of Soviet 
policy in Czechoslovakia. This is the story that is usually told, the story of how the 
winners won and how and why they had been bound from the outset to win 2 6 . 
Despite the importance (and in a sense primacy) of this other story, there is con-
siderable value in examining the constraints on Soviet policy in post-invasion Czecho-
See, e. g. Tigr id , Pavel: La chutě irrésistible d'Alexandre Dubček. Calmann-Levy, Paris 
1969.- Kusin 1978,7-65.- Ski l l ing 1976,813-823. 
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slovakia. This may help us to understand better the character of Soviet policy in 
Eastern Europe more generally and the kinds of constraints to which it is subject. 
Furthermore, exploration of the resilience of reformism under the pressure of "nor­
malization" may yield insight into what lies beneath the surface of Czechoslovak poli­
tics up to the present day and, more generally, into the forces driving the process of 
restructuring in all the European Communist states. 
The Soviet Union was clearly capable of destroying Czechoslovakia or of bringing 
about the changes it desired by imposing martial law or any one of a number of con-
ceivable policies involving force. Some analysts have suggested that the Soviets could 
not afford to employ such drastic measures because of the foreign policy consequences 
they would have entailed27. Yet, I believe it is a mistake to identify foreign policy con­
sequences as the as the principál set of constraints on Soviet policy. As suggested 
above, the Soviets expected their forces to be welcomed enthusiastically. From the 
Soviet point of view, the entry of allied troops onto Czechoslovak territory was not a 
foreign invasion or occupation, but simply a show of force to provide back-up for 
political forces sympathetic to the Soviet point of view to organize and do what they 
had long considered necessary but had not been able to do because ofthe dependency 
of the post-January regime upon populär support. The intervention was to serve a 
function analogous to U.S. President Eisenhower's dispatching troops to Little Rock 
and President Kennedy's dispatching troops to Birmingham. In both these cases, as 
was also clearly intended in the Czechoslovak čase, the purpose of military force was 
to lend support, both symbolic and operational, to those forces representing the "true 
interests of society". To be sure, since the legitimate authorities of the Czechoslovak 
Republic had not consented to the entry of their allies' troops and, after it took place, 
had characterized it as "a denial of the basic norms of international law" 2 8 , this action 
was clearly an illegal foreign invasion. But these facts, as well as the apparently 
unanimous Czechoslovak rejection of the intervention were, from the Soviet point of 
view, accidental outcomes which were not expected and should not have been allowed 
by the Czechoslovak leadership to happen 2 9. 
The record of Soviet behavior from the early hours of the intervention and through­
out the months and years that f ollowed, shows a stubborn, singleminded determination 
on the part of the Soviet leadership to facilitate the coalescence of a Czechoslovak 
leadership group which could be trusted but which, at the same time, would be capable 
of ruling by political and administrative means. 
AU evidence points to great Soviet reluctance to actually apply force. N o doubt, 
if violent resistance had broken out, it would have been put down by force. If the 
Situation in Czechoslovakia had appeared heading for a complete and irrevocable 
Soviet fiasco, some form of Soviet military rule might have been temporarily establish­
ed. But even at the height of the non-violent populär resistance that emerged in 
response to the invasion, the occupation troops showed great restraínt, even when 
provoked. The troops went to great lengths to show friendship toward the population, 
2 7
 See H e j z l a r 1976,280. 
2 8
 See L i t t e l l 1969,50. 
2 9
 See E i d l i n 1978 and E i d l i n 1980. 
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even t h o u g h their offers of friendship were almost universally s p u r n e d 3 0 . Moreover , 
in the m o n t h s that f ol lowed Soviet t roops and secret police forces t o o k n o part at all in 
the suppression of protests , demonstra t ions , or o ther social and political manifestati-
ons k n o w n t o be disturbing t o the Soviet leadership. 
N e i t h e r is there any indication whatsoever that the Soviets, at any t ime at tempted, 
intended or had any interest in taking contro l of any of the machinery of the C z e c h o ­
slovak C o m m u n i s t P a r t y or government, to exercise any of their functions, or even t o 
install a Czechoslovak p u p p e t leadership. All Soviet efforts were aimed at facilitating 
the emergence of a Czechoslovak leadership coalition that w o u l d take Soviet concerns 
m o r e ser ious ly 3 1 . 
3 0
 For an analysis of the character of the occupation see E i d l i n 1980, 51-57. 
3 1
 D u b č e k , Alexander: Proslov A. Dubčeka na zářiovém plénu ÚV KSČ. In: Svědectví 10 
(1970)267-280. - F o r example, on the night of the invasion, the Soviets apparently expected 
the entry of their troops alone to reinf orce the political influence of their sympathizers within 
the Presidium of the CPCz Central Committee enough to enable them to take control of that 
body (which was in Session at the time) by purely political means. N o Soviet military of KGB 
forces were sent to the Presidium to provide backup for supporters of the occupation, and the 
meeting went on for almost three hours, finally approving the text of a proclamation "to all 
the people of Czechoslovakia" condemning the intervention. 
Neither were any political directives given to the leaders of Czechoslovakia. The Soviet 
Ambassador to Czechoslovakia visited the President of the Republic shortly after the beginn­
ing of the invasion, and the President then went to the meeting of the CPCz Presidium. But 
the information he gave about his talk with the Ambassador does not suggest that Moscow 
had prepared any immediate political Solution for the Situation in the country ( H e j z l a r 
1976, 254; E i d l i n 1978, 253-254). The Presidium adjourned with the understandig that 
members would return to their offices or to the party hotel and wait to be contacted by a 
representative of the "allied" (i. e. occupation) forces, so that the Presidium could reassemble 
and decide on a further course of action ( D u b č e k 1970,277; S m r k o v s k ý 1975,16; 
G u e y t , Remi: La mutation tchěcoslovaque: analysée par un temoin 1968-1969. Paris 1969, 
288). Thus, as Remi Gueyt writes, given the available evidence: 
The only possibility left as confounding as this may be, is that theSoviets relied passive-
ly on the good will of organs and of people whom they had doně nothing to prepare or 
organize. It appears that the Soviets had not included any one in their game in advance, 
with the exception of Czechoslovaks already in Moscow ( G u e y t 1969, 289). 
A few Czechoslovak leaders sympathetic to the Soviet cause (who were quickly labelled as 
"collaborators") began early in the morning of August 21st to assist Soviet representatives in 
attempts to constitute a new political authority. Nevertheless, these "collaborators" did not 
attempt to impose themselves as the new rulers of the country, threatening the wrath of the 
occupation forces if they were not accepted. N o r did the Soviets attempt to impose a particu­
lar group of individuals as rulers. Soviet policy consistently strove to work within existing 
legitimate Czechoslovak institutions. 
The first attempt to constitute a new centre of political authority took place at a meeting of 
about one third of the membership of the CPCz Central Committee, in the party's hotel 
Praha, almost a füll day after the occupation had begun. And yet, although the "collabora­
tors ", as well as armed members of the occupation forces were present at this meeting, its out-
come was ambiguous. On the one hand, the resolution adopted at this meeting seems to 
accept the fact of the occupation, which it characterizes as "the harsh reality in which we have 
found ourselves and which cannot be changed at once". O n the other hand, this meeting did 
not in any way welcome the intervention. Indeed, it expressed füll support for the position 
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T o be sure, the Soviets sought persistently to split the Czechoslovak leadership. In 
the m o n t h s following the M o s c o w negotiat ions, various measures were taken to dis-
cover and exploit divisions wi thin the Czechoslovak leadership, t o weaken the polit i­
cal posit ions of individuals they opposed and s trengthen the posi t ions of those they 
trusted and favored. T h e Soviets also cont inued t o press the Czechos lovak leadership 
for further concessions and greater compliance wi th Soviet desires. Yet all changes 
were b r o u g h t a b o u t b y political means, and relevant decisions and actions were take 
by the Czechos lovak leadership. 
A fundamental premise of Soviet policy was, therefore, t o achieve its aims and o b -
jectives t h r o u g h legitimate Czechos lovak authorit ies and inst i tut ions. This premise 
imposed i m p o r t a n t constraints on Soviet pol icy, since if key reformists had resigned 
in protest , the tenuous political f ramework achieved t h r o u g h the M o s c o w negotiat ions 
might well have collapsed. 
Some analysts w h o have studied the post- intervention Situation see D u b č e k and his 
associates as terr ibly naive t o have t h o u g h t that t h e y could remain in p o w e r and 
preserve even a modified version of the Par ty ' s reform p r o g r a m . M l y n á ř writes that he 
recognized his o w n hopes and expectations t o be i l lusory barely a m o n t h after the 
negotiations in M o s c o w 3 2 . Yet m o s t of the principál m e m b e r s of the reform leader­
ship, a l though natural ly differing t o some extent in their assessment of w h a t was 
realizable seemed t o have genuinely believed in the possibility of their success 3 3 . These 
taken by the CPCz Presidium which had characterized the intervention as "contrary to the 
fundamental principles of relations between socialist states and a denial of the basic norms of 
international law". If this rump Central Committee meeting is considered as an attempt at 
establishing some sort of collaborationist authority, it should be noted that it came late, was 
sharply divided in its debates and unsuccessful in establishing such an authority ( E i d l i n 
1978,256-257). 
An explicit attempt to constitute a temporary combined Party and Government authority 
which took place in the Soviet Embassy on August 22nd, the second day of the occupation, 
has been described in some detail by Zdeněk Mlynář, who actually participated in these dis­
cussion ( M l y n á ř 1978, 241-253). The Soviet Ambassador left the group of Czechoslovak 
of ficials mostly comprised of thosemembers of the CPCz Presidium who had not been arrest-
ed to work out these matters by themselves. Some members of the group were willing to 
accept positions in the "revolutionary 'workers and peasants' government" under discussion, 
but others had reservations. In any čase, there was agreement that Dubček and the other 
members of the leadership (whose whereabouts and status were unclear) would have to take 
part in any definitive arrangements and when Mlynář proposed that the discussions be moved 
to Prague Castle and include the President of the Republic, no one, including the Soviet 
Ambassador, was opposed ( M l y n á ř 1978, 251). 
President Svoboda rejected the proposal that had been discussed at the Soviet Embassy and 
demanded face to face negotiations with the top Soviet leadership in Moscow. The Soviets 
accepted. In Moscow, Svoboda demanded the inclusion of those leaders who had beenintern-
ed on the day of the invasion. 
By this point, the Soviet leadership had recognized that an alternative Czechoslovak 
leadership was not politically possible and, by August 25th at the latest, had accepted the 
necessity of allowing the same leadership that had existed before the invasion to return to 
p o w e r f M l y n á ř 1978,271). 
3 2
 M l y n á ř 1978,314. 
3 3
 See,e.g. M l y n á ř 1978,316-321.- S m r k o v s k ý 1975,23-25.- S m r k o v s k ý , Josef:Das 
Smrkovský Interview der italienischen Kommunisten. Osteuropa-Archiv (1972), A91 - A92. 
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optimistic beliefs figured importantly in the resolve of these reformist leaders to stay in 
power. Given the fundamental premises of their policy, the Soviet leadership could 
not risk pushing so far or so fast as to drive the key reformists to give up hope and 
resign. 
Finally, having recognized the centrality of Soviet commitment to a political Solu­
tion of their problems with Czechoslovakia, we can immediatley see practical con­
straints on Soviet policy which help explain some of the incongruities sketched out in 
the first part of this paper. These constraints have much to do with limitations on 
Information, knowledge, and understanding. The map of Czechoslovak politics had 
been shaken up by the intervention and its consequences, and had to be recharted by 
Soviet policy makers. Among other things, several of the most reliable supporters of 
Soviet positions in the Czechoslovak leadership had been politically lamed through 
being labelled as "collaborators", and virtually all Czechoslovak leaders at all levels 
had condemned the intervention and acted in conjunction with the resistance to it. 
Soviet policy makers theref ore had to scrutinize caref ully the whole ränge of personnel 
at the higher levels of CPCz leadership in order to determine who could be relied upon 
and in order to have them insinuated into positions in which they could be of as­
sistance. 
Constraints on the Reformists: The Logic of Reform 
Was it really inevitable that the Czechoslovak reformists would fail? Were the 
Soviets really determined to remove Dubček, Černík, Smrkovský and others who 
symbolized the reform movement from their positions of power and influence? Did 
they really want to place Czechoslovakia under the narrow group of leaders complete-
ly isolated from the population which has ruled the country since the completion of 
"normalization", and which has been so strikingly unsuccessful in broadening its base 
of support and legitimacy ? Did the Soviets really intend for reform in Czechoslovakia 
to be roUed back as far as it eventually was, leaving the country so severely demoralized 
and with so many serious unresolved problems ? What if the whole group of reformists 
had adopted a Stance similar to that adopted by Gustav Husák, who took over the 
leadership of the CPCz from Dubček in April 1969, and remained at the heim until 
1988? Why could not all the reformists together have adopted a Stance similar to 
Husak's, and together rescued more of the aims and aspirations of the "Prague 
Spring"? Why couldn't the reformists have sought first to win the confidence of the 
Soviet leadership, even if this had meant taking unpopulär measures and alienating 
much of the population. Having done this, could they not have proven their reliability 
to the Soviets and gradually won greater latitude to carry out a significant part of their 
program, and eventually regain their popularity and the confidence and support of the 
people? Is this not, after all, essentially what Jánoš Kádár had done with such great 
success in the years after the Soviet invasion of Hungary? 
During the first month or so after the signing of the Moscow Protocol, Zdeněk Mly­
nář attempted to strike out on a political course something like this. In fact, some ob-
servers at the time noted a similarity between the stances of Mlynář and Husák and 
276 Bohemia Band 19 (1988) 
categorized them both as "realists"3 4. Unlike Husák however, Mlynář came quickly 
to recognize a fundamental incompatibility between the aim of winning Soviet confi­
dence and the aim of preserving the essentials of the Party's reform program 3 5. The 
failure of Husak's stratégy places in reliéf the constraints perceived by Mlynář and the 
other reformists who rejected the strategie Option of striving to satisfy the Soviets first, 
even at the expense of alienating the public. For, in the long run, although Husák 
remained in power for a long time, he was not successful either in approaching 
solutions to the pressing problems that gave rise to the 1968 reform movement in the 
first place, or in winning populär support for himself or the "normalized" regime 
which he led. As Dalimil wrote in 1973, paraphrasing what Ludvík Vaculík said in 
J une 1967, "In five years the occupation of Czechoslovakia has not solved even a single 
one of the problems that had built up before January 1968". Or, as Mlynář put it in 
1975: " O n the surface it seems thateverythingis in aecordwith all that is officially 
asserted. However, under the surface our society is extraordinarily, gravely ill. This 
illness is chronic and for all of the past six years it cannot be talked about; its cause 
cannot even be named." The cause, continued Mlynář, is that in August 1968 the 
"natural efforts of Czechoslovak society to achieve a more rational Organization of 
things . . . " were forcibly suppressed36. 
But why was there such fundamental incompatibility between winning the confi­
dence of the Soviets and preserving some modified variant of reform? Wasn't some 
middle-of-the-road Solution feasible? And why has it not been possible to move 
beyond "normalization" back to the implementation of unnecessary reform - albeit 
more cautiously and at a slower páce than in 1968? 
The Regime itself as the Principal Impediment to Reform: By the spring of 1968, 
there was broad consensus throughout Czechoslovakia that any truly effective reform 
would have to be preceded by fundamental changes in the political regime itself. It 
was widely recognized, as the Action Program states, that the "underlying causes" of 
a wide ränge of Czechoslovakia's problems were attributable to "deformations of the 
political systém"3 7. As Pavel Kohout put it, almost a year after the intervention: "We 
didn't freely think up the Action Program. It reflected the true needs of the Party and 
of the whole society."3 8 Writing in a similar vein several years later, Alexander Dub­
ček referred to the "crisis in the Party and in society . . . which resulted as the conse-
quence of a long-term crisis beginning in the fifties and reaching a peak in the 
sixties"39. 
34
 For example this was the consensus in discussions to which I was a party at Radio Free 
Europe's Headquarters in Munich during the month of September 1968. 
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 M l y n á ř 1978,314-318. 
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 M l y n á ř , Zdeněk/Hájek, Jiří: Hovoří Z. Mlynář aj. Hájek. In: Listy (1975) Nr. 12,13. 
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 Akční program komunistické strany Československa 1968, 8. 
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This was not just idle talk. The five years prior to the replacement of Antonin 
Novotný as CPCz First Secretary in January 1968 and the eight months of the "Prague 
Spring" had taught the Czechs and Slovaks some profound lessons which could not be 
forgotten or rationalized away. During the last five years of the Novotný era, the top 
Party leadership, faced with severe political and economic crisis, had begun to experi-
ment with reform. Even more significantly, throughout Czechoslovak society com-
plaints, criticisms, and ideas for reform were increasingly widely discussed and articu-
lated. However, the implementation of reforms was allowed only to the point that the 
entrenched power holders considered safe. Consequently, in area after area in which 
the need for reform was perceived, the Party leadership stood in the way with petty 
intervention and obstruction. As Karel Reyman wrote in the spring of 1968: 
Social scientists and other intellectuals had had no difficulty in diagnosing the 
root of the problém. That it rested primarily with a political systém designed sole-
ly to transmit Orders from above while allowing for no genuine participation on 
the lower levels, that the most uninspired segment of the vast bureaucracy assured 
continuation of the vicious circle, and that the only way out of the vicious circle 
was a basic change in the political systém - all this had long been known and 
advocated by the reformers40. 
By the time of Novotny's replacement, the regime itself had come to be recognized 
as - indeed to symbolize - the principle obstacle to any real Solutions to the country's 
various pressing problems. As Stanley Riveles shows, in his highly revealing study of 
the dechne and fall of the Novotný regime, "the Strands of Opposition to various 
aspects of the leadership's policy came together in a coalition demanding fundamental 
reform in part because Opposition to one set of specific policies implied Opposition to 
another set"41. 
A major component of the political problém faced by the post-January reform lead-
ership was that to win the support necessary to address the country's problems, it 
would have to prove its commitment to meaningful and consistent reform. It would 
have to prove that it had abandoned definitively the style and methods of rule which 
had brought discredit upon the old leadership. This is why the Czechoslovak reform-
ists could not - before or after the 1968 intervention - do consistently what the 
Soviets required them to do. As Smrkovský put it (referring to discussions held with 
the Soviet leadership in May 1968), "they demanded a hard administrative, I should 
rather say police-like course of action against everyone in our country who stated his 
opinions, if they were not fully in harmony with the documents and policies of the 
40
 Reyman , Karel: The Winds of Change in Czechoslovakia. Radio Free Europe Research, 
Czechoslovakia 1968, 19. - E id l in , Fred: January, August, and after: Czechoslovakia's 
Triumph and Tragédy. Radio Free Europe Research, Czechoslovakia 1969, 1-4. 
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Party" 4 2 . Had the Situation escaped the control ofthe Party, its post-January leader­
ship seems to have been capable and willing to use such measures. But the objective 
Situation in Czechoslovakia was very much under control throughout the pre-inva­
sion period. Therefore, any resort to an "administrative-police-like course of action" 
would have been widely perceived as proof that the regime had not really changed its 
character and was not deserving of confidence and support. 
The Problem ofthe Invasion, itself: Before the invasion, it was possible to be enthu-
siastically committed to reform and to be, at the same time, sympathetic to the Soviet 
Union and its concerns. This was indeed a combination of attitudes which the 
Czechoslovak leadership worked very hard to foster. Before the intervention it was 
possible to believe that, all threats and expressions of concern notwithstanding, the 
Soviets did have some understanding for the CPCz reform program (as the Soviets, 
themselves, had incessantly claimed), and would, in the final analysis, not resort to 
military intervention. The invasion made it much more difficult for people to believe 
that the Soviets were truly sincere in their expressions of sympathy with the funda­
mental principles of the CPCz reform program. This, in turn, made it far more diffi­
cult for the Czechoslovak leadership to maintain confidence among the population 
that reform would continue. And the need to maintain such confidence placed even 
greater constraints on the kinds of action the leadership could take, just at the time 
when it was being required to take actions that would be likely to undermine confi­
dence even further. 
Secondly, before the intervention, the remarkable unity of the peoples of Czecho­
slovakia could be seen as a positive phenomenon, even from the Soviet point of view. 
After all, nevěr before had an East European Communist Party enjoyed such broad 
and enthusiastic support. The invasion reinforced the unity of the people and further 
strengthened populär support for the Communist Party and its leadership. However, 
it also gave this national unity an anti-Soviet character. This anti-Soviet national unity 
was, of course, intolerable from the Soviet point of view. It was a unity which would 
have to be broken, regardless of its value - indeed indispensability - for the building 
of a viable regime in Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak reformists were thus placed 
in the impossible Situation of winning Soviet confidence while, at the same time, seek-
ing to maintain a Czechoslovak unity that, although necessary for their success, had 
unfortunately become anti-Soviet. 
Conclusion 
The dilemmas of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and 1969 have an interest and relevance 
that go far beyond thatparticular čase history. The problems the Czechoslovak reform­
ists attempted to resolve in 1968 and 1969 are problems shared by all the regimes in 
the Soviet bloc. And the fears which events in Czechoslovakia evoked in 1968 and 
4 2
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1969 among the power holders of these states are indicative of what Stands in the way 
of viable Solutions to these problems. As J. F. Brown writes: 
Both the logic and the dynamics of the East-European Situation constantly 
demand that certain basic problems be solved - the Prague Spring was a serious 
ánd humane attempt to do just that - and the more the Soviets try, through re-
pression, diversion, or evasion, to dodge these problems, the more acute they will 
become, and the more relevant the Prague Spring will be . . . It never really lost its 
relevance for Eastern Europe and this is now being recognized more than ever 
before43. 
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